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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE <pF UTAH

DELWYN G. TAYLOR and NANCY L. TAYLOR,
his wifef and ELSIE E. CURTIS,
Respondents,
vs.
pRQpESSI0NAL

UNITED

Bunj3ER

,s

SUPPLY, INC. and FLOYD E . BENTON,
individually,
Appellants - Petitioners

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The questions Presented for Review

Did t h e Court o f Appeals s o far depart] from the accepted
and usual course o f judicial proceedings ^ s t o call f o r a n
exercise • of the Supreme Coi irt .'s power of si ipervision;
1.
judgement

B y allowing a lower court t o alt^r the terms o f a
after

entry

s o that

t h e court

could

enforce a

stipulation agaii ist :>:t: i ] y 01w:::::ic: Ide of tl: :ie ] i ti gat ion;
2.

B y allowing

sumrtary

judgement

according t o

stipulation t o stand when there existed a factual dispute a s t o
the terms of the stipulation;
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3.

By misinterpreting an occurance to be a detriment to

respondents

instead

of

a

windfall

and

letting

that

misinterpretation influence their judgement;
4. By allowing unusually harsh sanctions for the mere late
compliance with the stipulation in that performcince for the other
side was excused?
5.

By failing to ascertain that the Appellants maintained

that the stipulated payment was meant to be segregated with the
result that either a portion of the judgment should have been
returned as the party owing that portion of the stipulated amount
had filed bankruptcy or the summary judgment should have been
vacated because of the presence of a factual dispute.
The Court of Appeals rendered a not-for-publication opinion
in this matter on December 2, 1987, a copy of which is attached
in an appendix.
Jurisdiction to review by a writ of certiorari is proper
pursuant to UCA 78-2-2(3)(a) and UCA 78-2a-4. The decision sought
to be reviewed was entered on December 2,1987 in the Utah Court
of Appeals.

Statement of the Case

Nature of the case
This

matter

involves

the

one-sided

enforcment

of

a

stipulation between parties according to summary judgment when
the terms of the stipulation were in dispute.
- 2 -

in'"oui se cif Proceeding*.;
The Third District Court in Salt Lake County rendered a
summary judgment against Appellants on motipn

respondents

according to the partiaJ terms of a stipulation. After Appellants
unsuccessfully sought to have both sides o£ the stipulation
enforced by fiip district coin I ,. npf^al wai hjRpn in tU (ourl nl
Appeals.

Not receiving any relief from the Court of Appeals,

Appellant petitions for a Writ of Certiorari for review by this
• :::oui:t

Statement of Facts
The parties were involved in ] itigatioft below which was
settled at a pretrial conference by stipulation]. The stipulation
was oral with no document setting forth the contents and terms of
the stipulation ever having been signed by tlfie parties or the
judge.

No citation to the record is made as there is no such

ilcx/uinetit I, iiillhoijqli rounstji

Im

teisiKJtiileiiil piepaied ciii urder

Pursuant to Stipulation which is in the record at pages 65 to 67
in its unsigned state.

The onlj undisputed terms

r::t:ipulat ic i :t we re

Appellai its we -i 'e to

I 1 ul

* the

pay

to

respondents within 30 days and that respondent^ were to deliver
title to a motorhome to Appellants and hold Appellants harmless
It oin air, I lent) ut i i aims to the motorhome*

See page 2 of

respondents' brief and page 4 of Appellantsf[ brief.
Appellants cited

several provisions

'rew\

Because

iResj-oncletiti *' I'udfr

Pursuant
undisputed

to

Stipulation

terms

of

the

in Appellants1
stipulation,

brief
the

to

Court

illustrate
of

Appeals

erroneously believed that Appellants had adopted that entire
document as correctly reflecting the stipulated terms. See page 4
of the opinion, 4th sentence of the 1st full paragraph.
allowing

sanctions

are still

disputed.

Also terms

Tterms
of the

stipulation concerrning which respondents were to receive which
part of the $17,750 are also disputed. Page 138 of the record.
Appellants had some difficulties with a land transaction
and were unable to make the payment of the $17,750.

Respondents

then made a motion for summary judgement and noticed the hearing
on the motion for October 31, 1983. Because of a clerical errorf
Appellants' counsel appeared one hour late after the motion was
granted.

Pages 88 and 89 of the record. Thereafter, a judgement

was prepared by respondents' counsel and signeci by the judge on
November 4, 1983.

The order unambiguously

designates an award

of $17,750 in accordance with the stipulation and an award of
$250 for attorney's fees as a sanction.

Page 82 of the record.

Appellants have been unsuccessful at getting the summary
judgement set aside or getting the other half of the stipulation
enforced. See record at pages 86 to 96, 126 to 140, 153 to 158
166 to 168, 173 20m 177 and 192 to 202.

The judge ultimately

claimed the judgement a sanction in its entirety in an attenpt to
justify the uneven enforcement

of the stipulation. Page 205

paragraph 4 of the record.
- 4 -

Partway through the process, Appellant Benton filed a
chapter ±± uankruptc
against

-1

collection

* /
-

—

.,•*

!aoed an automatic stay
u.::

was

to be

paid

to

respondant Curtis out of the a7,750 payment because the $5,000
%

.

-

- . ^ i v e l y against Benton.

.«:;..,.-,.,:

The lower court refused to honor the automatic stay and permitted
collection of the $5,000 from the corporate Appellant. See pages

The motorhome Appellants were to receive was sold by
respondents at an execution solo which wv.\ marked by n.regularity
as the sale was not properly noticed
the ultimate buyer, received
record) T
dismissing

\*- only noticfe. (page 164 of the

•

w:ii 1 .1 i t :1 :ie ] i enl lolder

an action for the

motorhome, making
Appelljnli

j

as tl4 lienholder, who was

then

$12,000 balance owing oii the

t rv effective sale fori $13,000, for which

'Mil1,

.<

Respondent's brief.

in lit

i t.i

VI, QUI'

-ip ^

Of

The Court of Appeals ^as unaware of this

dismissal as evidenced by the last sentence df the fi rst foot .note
< : f their opinion.
Sunmary of argument
Stipulations

should

IN1 enforced

m>1

iml>

one

way,

particularly where it imposes tremendous burden on one side while
granting a windfall to the other side.

Unambiguous judgments

shoi :0 ci i lot be al te :i ed, but s In >uJ d stai id or f al ] o:i i 1 :hei i: original
signed

form.

The

rule

that

summary
_

5

_

judgments

based

on

stipulations may not be set aside for excusable neglect must be
tempered

when

stipulation.

factual
The

disputes

Utah

state

exist
courts

as

to

terms

should

of

the

respect

the

jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Court as to the
automatic stay when bankruptcy actions commence.
ARGUMENT
1.

The judgement prepared by respendantfs counsel and

signed by the judge clearly purports to enforce a

stipulation

between the parties. The order reads,
1.
That Plaintiff be awarded Judgement against
defendants in the amount of $17,750, in accordance
with the Stipulation heretofore referred to, plus
interest at the legal rate from the date of judgement
hereof.
2. That Plaintiff's Attorney, Stott P. Harston of
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin be awarded the
amount of $250.00 as a sanction against defendants
for the necessity of counsel bringing the Motion for
Summary Judgement and for sanctions.
(Page 82 of the record.)
If the court can enforce one side of the stipulation why
can't it enforce the other side?

Uneven enforcment of a

stipulation is clearly an abuse of judicial discretion.

That the

stipulation provided for Respondents to give Appellants clear
title to the motorhome has never been disputed.

Why was that

provision left out of the judgement?
Counsel for respondent and the judge later tried to avoid
this claim by characterizing the entire judgment as a sanction
against appellant.

But the order clearly designates the $17,750
- 6 -

as

in

accordance

with

the

stipulation

with

the

S250

for

attorney,s fees as the only sanction.

If the judgment was for

sanctions then why was the judgment

not initially prepared

accordingly?

"If the language of a judgement is clear and

unambiguous,it must be enforced as it speaks."
l
Corporation v. Ensign Conpany, 586 P.2d 44b.

Park City Utah
So the judgement

must be enforced, if at all, as it speaks, as a judgement
according to stipulation.

As such it canipt stand as it is a

one-sided abuse of discretion.
2.
for

Even if the judgement could be cl^aracterized as being

sanctions,

the

availability

of

sMch

sanctions

was

sufficiently in factual dispute as to reqiiire the granting of
Appellant fs timely Rule 60(b) motion to set aside for excusable
neglect.

"(D)iscretion should be exerciser in furtherance of

justice and should incline towards granting Relief in a doubtful
case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Helgeson v.
Inyangumia,636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) a^ cited by the Court
of Appeals in their opinion on page 5.

Tfie rule in Kopel v.

Davie, 163 Colo. 57, 428 P.2d 712 (Colo.1967) that parties cannot
move to vacate a judgement entered pursuant Ito a stipulation on
grounds of excusable neglect makes no sense w)ien the terms of the
stipulation

are

in factual dispute.

Thq Court

of Appeals

recognized on page 2 of their opinion under Disputed Issues of
Facts that material factual disputes as to the elements of a
stipulation will preclude the entry of summary judgement.
- 7 -

The

court just failed to recognize that there were and are factual
disputes as to the terms of the stipulation. The availability of
sanctions

for

nonperformance

of

the

stipulation

and

the

divisibility of the $17 ,750 payment between the respondents have
always been in dispute.

Reference to portions of the proposed

order prepared by respondents1 counsel to show undisputed terms
of the stipulation did not constitute an adoption of the entire
document

as

an

accurate

reflection

of

the

stipulation

as

misapprehended by the Court of Appeals.
3.

The

followed,

would

undisputed
have

portions

yielded

the

of

the

following

stipulation, if
results.

The

Appellants would have received a motorhome free and clear of all
liens and paid $17,750 to respondents.

The respondents would

have received $17,750 from which they would have had to pay off
the claims against the motorhome, which were somewhere between
$10,000 and $12f000.

As it turns out, Appellant had to pay the

cash, but did not get the motorhome.

The motorhome was sold at

an execution sale by the respondents to the lienholder for $1,000
which was credited to Appellant.

After the sale, the lienholder

dismissed the action against respondents in what was in essence
payment under the table in the amount of $12,000, for which
Appellant

received

no

credit.

This

is

all

admitted

in

Respondents brief on page 16, but the Court of Appeals missed
it.

So the Respondents got the $17,750 in cash and were allowed

to keep it all as the action by the lienholder was dismissed
- 8 -

according to some apparently collusive arrangement made at the
sale of the motorhome.

Respondents clearly received a windfall

over what they had bargained for in the stipulation.

A close

reading of the Court of Appeals opinion reveals that the court
did rely on the potential detrimental effects of the lienholder
suit against
actions.

the respondents

in upholding the lower courtfs

Respondents ultimately benefited from the situation to

the clear detriment of Appellants.

If the Court of Appeals

decision is based on the erroneous assumption that a portion of
the cash garnished from Appellants went to pay off the obligation
on the motorhome instead of into respondents pocket, then the
judgement should be readjusted on that basiq alone.
4.

Even if the summary

judgment stands for want of

factual dispute, and even if the initial order can be changed
from

enforcing

the

Appellants, the order

stipulation

to

be

a

sanction

against

is so harsh that to enforce it as a

sanction would be an abuse of discretion.

The bottom line is

that Appellants made late payment according to the stipulation.
The remedy for the non-payment of money is interest

(Reed v.

Armstrong, 6 U.2d 291, 312 P.2d 777 and Walker v. Rocky Mountain
Recreation Corp., 29 U.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538.) not the release of
the other side of the bargain while still demanding payment.

If

respondents wanted to avoid having to deliver clear title to the
motorhome, they should have sought to rescind the stipulation.
As it is, they got to "have their cake ajid eat it too" while
- 9 -

depriving Appellants from any benefit they were to derive from
the

stipulation.

Nothing

was

lost

to

respondents

by

the

lienholder suit on the motorhome as the suit was dismissed, thus
relieving respondents from paying the balance on the lien which
became a $12,000 windfall to respondants.

The equity in the

motorhome was lost to Appellants when respondents conducted the
collusive execution sale where Appellants only got credit for
$1,000 of the $13,000 that effective changed hands.
5.

Appellant Benton in his affidavit on page 138 of the

record averred that $5f000 of the stipulated amount was to go to
Respondent Curtis. The only claim that Curtis had in the lawsuit
was a personal claim against Benton. When Benton filed a Chapter
11 Bankruptcy proceeding, all actions against him personally were
stayed

pursuant

362(a)(1).
the

to

the

automatic

stay

in

11 USCA

Section

But respondents still collected the divisible part of

stipulated

payment

that

could

be

attributed

to

Benton

personally from the corporate Appellant in disregard of Federal
bankruptcy law and the jurisdiction of the Federal court system.
The $5,000 must be returned under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution.
Respondents

claimed

in

their

brief

that

because

the

divisibility of the payment was not mentioned in the summary
judgment order, the entire amount could be collected from either
Appellant.

This is just another point that shows that at the

least Appellants1 URCP Rule 60B should have been granted as a
factual dispute existed as to terms of the stipulation.
- 10 -

SUMMARY
A stipulation was made between the parties.

Respondents

have gotten the full measure of the benefits to be given them
under the agreement.

Appellants have yet to receive anything,

Respondents used the stipulation to get a summary judgement
against Appellants and then repudiated tlpe stipulation after
enforcing performance in full by Appellants.] Such actions should
never have been sanctioned by either the qistrict Court or the
Court of Appeals.
Dated the 4th day of January, 1988.

Ronald C. Barker,
Attorney for[ Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 4th da^ of January, 1988, I
caused a copy of the foregoing to be mailed to Stott P. Harston,
P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo

DEC

319 8 7

Delwyn G. Taylor and
Nancy L. Taylor, his wife,
and Elsie E. Curtis,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Professional United Builders
Supply, Inc., and Floyd E.
Benton, individually,

Cfase No.

Defendants and Appellants.
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson and Davidson.

860039-CA

FILED
DEC 2 1987
Timothy M Shea
Cierfc of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Defendants, Professional United Builderfs Supply, Inc.
(Professional) and Floyd E. Benton (Benton) appeal a judgment
entered in favor of plaintiffs, Delwyn Gi Taylor, Nancy L.
Taylor (the Taylors) and Elsie E. Curtis (Curtis). Defendants
seek to vacate the judgment and remand Of to enforce the
parties1 settlement agreement.
I.
FACTS
In January 1982, plaintiffs brought kn action against
defendants claiming that: 1) Curtis loaned Benton $15,000 in
January 1980, $5,000 of which was still owing; 2) the Taylors
had signed three uniform real estate contracts as buyers which
Benton represented would transfer certaii real property to them
at no cost and allow the Taylors to late]: sell the property for
profit; 3) over a year later the Taylors transferred title to a
motor home to Benton or Professional as credit on some
properties and Benton or Professional agreed to assume $363 per
month payments owed on the motor home to Citicorp; and 4)
Benton or Professional made payments to Citicorp for about ten
months but discontinued making the payments in September 1980.
Plaintiffs* complaint sought payment of $5,000 to Curtis,

a determination that the uniform real estate contracts were
null and void# possession of the motor home, payment of
arrearages on the $363/month obligation to Citicorp, and
$600/month damages for the Taylors1 loss of use of the motor
home.
During a pretrial conference, the parties entered into an
oral stipulation that defendants would pay plaintiffs $17,750
within thirty days of August 22, 1983, and plaintiffs, in turn,
would deliver to defendants clear title to the motor home.
They also agreed that sanctions would be imposed if either
party failed to perform. Defendants failed to comply with the
stipulation. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
and sanctions which was heard pursuant to notice at 9:00 a.m.
on October 31, 1983. Defendants1 attorney did not appear to
oppose the motion and it was granted.
At 10:11 a.m. on the day of the hearing, defendants filed
an affidavit in opposition to the motion, On November 4, 1983,
judgment was entered awarding plaintiffs $17,750 plus interest
and $250 in attorney fees. On November 16, 1983, defendants
filed a motion to file an amended answer and counterclaim and a
motion to vacate the summary judgment. Defendants' motion
alleged that the affidavit filed on the day of the hearing
demonstrated that issues of fact existed which precluded entry
of summary judgment. Defendants also contended that their
attorney's secretary erroneously noted the time of the hearing
causing him to miss the hearing. The court denied the motion
to vacate.
In January of 1984, plaintiffs commenced execution
proceedings on their $17,750 judgment against defendants. A
sheriff's sale of the motor home was conducted, at which
Intermountain Sports bid and purchased the motor home for
$1,000.* Plaintiffs also obtained a garnishee judgment
against a company owing money to Professional. Execution on
that judgment fully satisfied plaintiffs' judgment against
defendants.
1. The Taylors had purchased the motor home from Intermountain
Sports. The purchase was financed through Citicorp, apparently
on a recourse basis. When the loan went into default,
Intermountain repurchased the subject note from Citicorp. In
February 1983, Intermountain Sports sued the Taylors for the
balance owing on the note. At some point in time, Intermountain
repossessed the motor home. The record before us does not
indicate whether Intermountain Sports obtained a money judgment
against the Taylors.

860039-CA
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On January 31, 1984, plaintiffs fil< id a satisfaction of
judgment and a motion to set aside the 0< tober 31 judgment
against Benton due to his pending bankru] tcy. The court set
aside the judgment with regard to Benton
On February 10, 1984,
defendants filed an -Amendment and Suppli ment To Motion To
Declare Judgment Satisfied, and Motion f< r Judgment Against
Plaintiffs.*2 According to defendants, he portion of the
August 22, 1983 stipulation requiring pl< intiffs to deliver to
defendants clear title to the motor home should have been
enforced. Since clear title was not del: vered, defendants
asserted the value of the motor home was owed to defendants. On
March 5, 1984, the court entered an orde: denying the motions
filed by defendants and stating that the November 4, 1983
judgment was not merely an extension of he parties1 stipulation
but was a sanction for defendants* noncoi ipliance with the
stipulation. This appeal followed.
Defendants contend the trial court irred in: 1) refusing to
vacate the summary judgment where disputed issues of material
fact existed; 2) refusing to vacate the judgment which was
entered as a result of excusable neglect] and 3) failing to order
reimbursement of $5,000 to Benton because of his bankruptcy.
II.
DISPUTED ISSUES OF ^ACT
Defendants first contention is that the trial court erred
in refusing to vacate the summary judgment on the grounds that
material disputes of material fact existed. The judgment entered
by the court was based on the parties* stipulation, not the
issues framed by the complaint and other pleadings. Therefore,
we confine our analysis to whether or not there were material
factual disputes as to the elements of tne stipulation only.
When a party refuses to perform its obligations under a
stipulation, the court is empowered to enter judgment embodying
the terms of the stipulation. Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309,
445 P.2d 144, 146 (1968). The affidavitIfiled by plaintiffs in
support of their motion for summary judgment states, in material
part, that: (1) defendants had agreed to pay plaintiffs $17,750
within thirty days; (2) defendants failed to pay that sum; (3)
the trial court had said sanctions would be considered if either
party failed to comply with the stipulati on; and (4) defendants'
failure to pay the stipulated amount had resulted in prejudice to
plaintiffs because of a suit filed by Intermountain Sports for in
excess of $16,000. A proposed order, ref lecting the terms of the
2. This followed a Motion to Declare Judgment Satisfied In Part
and Ascertain Disposition of Garnished Fiends, filed by
defendants on February 1, 1984.

860039-CA
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stipulation prepared by plaintiffs' counsel, includes the
additional provision that plaintiffs were to transfer title to
the motor home to one or both defendants.
Defendants' affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment
was not timely filed and/ therefore, was not before the court
when it granted the motion.3 However, even if the affidavit
had been timely filed, it did not refute that defendants had
stipulated to payment of $17,750 within thirty days and had
failed to pay that amount within the specified time. Nor did
the affidavit deny that their failure to pay resulted in
Intermountain Sports' suit against the Taylors. Further,
although the affidavit does dispute the reference to sanctions
in plaintiffs' affidavit, a later filing by defendants adopts
plaintiffs' proposed order pursuant to stipulation as correctly
reflecting the settlement terms, including the possibility of
sanctions. Therefore, there were no material issues of fact as
to the terms of the stipulation which would preclude entry of
summary judgment.
In February 1984, defendants filed a motion for judgment
against plaintiffs. The motion appears to claim that
plaintiffs owe defendants money because they did not provide
clear title to the motor home to defendants, as was
stipulated. The timeliness of this motion is, again,
questionable. However, the trial court had before it
uncontroverted evidence that the failure of defendants to pay
the $17,750 within thirty days had resulted in suit by
Intermountain Sports against the Taylors and repossession of
the motor home by Intermountain Sports.4 Therefore,
plaintiffs' failure to perform was caused by the action of
defendants which made it impossible for plaintiffs to perform.
Furthermore, the parties* stipulation had contemplated
possible sanctions for failure to perform. Parties to
litigation may, at their option, enter into a settlement
stipulation providing that if one fails to perform, judgment
may be entered which differs from the performance required
under the stipulation. Vallev Nat'l Bank v. Sensitronics,
Inc., 497 P.2d 354, 357 (Colo. 1972). In this case
3. Defendants also filed an untimely Motion to Strike Affidavit,
addressed to portions of plaintiffs' affidavit. This motion does
not, however, refute the material portions of the stipulation
reflected in the judgment.
4. A portion of the $17,750 was to have been used to pay off the
motor home loan and thereby obtain clear title to the motor home.

860039-CA
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it was stipulated that if a party did ndt comply with the
settlement terms sanctions would be imposed. Judgment was
entered accordingly. Therefore# we find no error in the
courtfs entry of judgment under the factls of this case.
III.
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
Defendants' second claim is that thel court erred in
refusing to vacate the judgment on the grounds that their
attorney's failure to attend the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment was due to excusable neglect. Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms! as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect . . . .
The trial court is given broad disc retion in deciding
whether to grant or deny a motion to vac ite on the grounds of
excusable neglect under Utah R. Civ. P. >0(b). Valley Leasing
v. Houohton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 198 ); Helqesen v.
Invanoumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 19 H ) . H [Discretion
should be exercised in furtherance of ju; ;tice and should incline
towards granting relief in a doubtful ca ;e to the end that the
party may have a hearing." Helgesen, 63 P.2d at 1081. In
cases where summary judgment is entered mrsuant to stipulation,
the parties cannot move to vacate the ju< Igment based on
excusable neglect. Kopel v. Davie. 163 :olo. 57, 428 P.2d 712,
714 (1967).
Under Kopel, even if excusable neglect were present in this
case, it would be irrelevant because the court's judgment was
pursuant to the stipulation entered into by the parties in
August of 1983. In Kopel, the parties entered into a
stipulation which resulted in the entry of a summary judgment.
Subsequently, a substituted defendant moved to vacate the
judgment on the basis of inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect. The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld denial of the
motion as it did not involve a "default judgment in the true
sense of the word, but a stipulated judgment; consequently,
there was no mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.* is!, at 714. The court further noted that a valid
stipulation had occurred, without fraud or professional
incompetence by any party or legal counsel. A similar result is
appropriate in this case. Defendants' failure to attend the
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hearing on the motion for summary judgment, whether excusable or
not, is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the
stipulation upon which the judgment was based, a question not
raised by defendants.
IV.
BANKRUPTCY
Defendants* third claim of error that the judge erred in
failing to order reimbursement of the $5,000 collection on the
judgment to Benton due to his bankruptcy is without merit. The
judgment was against both defendants and was in fact, satisfied
by garnishing professional's sale of property. Therefore, the
judgment was paid by Professional rather than Benton. Although
the complaint originally claimed that Benton owed Curtis the
money, the answer filed on behalf of Professional admits that
Professional owes the debt to Curtis, denying that Benton is
obligated.
Affirmed.

Costs against defendants,,

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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